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Executive Summary
The Business Rates Retention Scheme came into effect on 1-Apr-2013.
It aims to encourage Local Authorities (LAs) to increase their income
from business rates in their area by ensuring that they get a financial
payoff from the rates they raise locally. One aspect of it is an optional
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1 Introduction
1.1 An outline of the problem
(1.1.1) The Business Rates Retention Scheme came into effect on 1-Apr-2013. It
aims to encourage Local Authorities (LAs) to increase their income from
business rates in their area by ensuring that they get a financial payoff
from the rates they raise locally.
(1.1.2) One aspect of it is an optional pooling scheme. This aims to encourage
nearby LAs to work together by providing a financial incentive for them
to be assessed jointly for business rates if they wish.
(1.1.3) Pooling is a decision by a set of geographically contiguous LAs to deal
with Central Government (CG) as a pool rather than individually. This
provides an incentive for them to work together.
(1.1.4) DCLG would like to provide tools to LAs to help them decide whether or
not to pool, and if so in what combinations. They have already provided
some tools to LAs for this, but the tools do not allow for the unpredictabil-
ity of actual business rates income x.
(1.1.5) There is high volatility in business rates income, x, over time. Modelling
should consider a wide range of possible growth scenarios.
(1.1.6) Data available includes LA baseline funding levels f , LA business rate
baselines r, and past data for the LA business rate incomes, x.
(1.1.7) Some particular questions that can be looked at:
• Are changes to the particular parameters in the current scheme (such
as the safety net or levy, defined in paragraphs 2.2.5 and 2.2.6) re-
quired to make pooling more attractive to local authorities?
• Is there a perfect make up of pools – and are there certain local au-
thority areas that would have benefited who have so far not pooled?
• Are there areas where pooling (under the current scheme) will never
be worth it, and if so what would it take to make it worth it?
2 The Business Rates Retention Scheme
2.1 Key variables
(2.1.1) Each LA’s dealings with CG, whether it joins a pool or not, are determined
by 3 quantities each year:
• Its baseline funding level, f , which is a CG estimate of what
resources the LA needs to have from the mechanism in order to
provide the necessary services to its area for the year;
1
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• Its business rates baseline, r, which is a CG estimate of the
amount the LA is expected to raise from the mechanism in its area
in the year;
• Its actual business rates income, x, i.e. that the LA receives from
the mechanism in its area in the year. The quantity r is the CG
estimate of x.
(2.1.2) The quantities f and r are set at the outset of the scheme by CG. In
subsequent years f and many of the quantities calculated using f and r
will be updated in line with inflation, but r itself will be fixed for the
next seven years. The quantities x are difficult to predict because of, for
instance, companies going out of business, or relocating, or successfully
appealing against their rating assessment.
2.2 The mechanism for billing authorities
(2.2.1) In this section we will consider billing authorities, which are LAs which
collect business rates (and council tax, though that is not relevant). For
the sake of simplicity we will assume that our billing authority belongs to
a county council. The information in this section is based on the official
documents [1] and [2].
(2.2.2) The actual business rates collected by an LA are some amount X > x.
Of the amount collected, X/2 goes direct to CG for redistribution, X/10
goes to the county council that the billing authority is part of, and X/100
goes to the fire service, so the x in the pooling problem is 39% of X.
(2.2.3) Each authority with f > r receives an amount f − r from CG. These are
referred to as top-up authorities: they need more funding than they are
expected to receive from rates, and CG makes up the difference.
(2.2.4) Each authority with f < r gives r − f to CG. These are referred to as
tariff authorities: they are expected to receive more from rates than they
need, so they contribute the excess to CG.
(2.2.5) This leaves the LA with an amount l = x+ f − r (but with a safety net
from CG which ensures that l is never less than 0.925f).
(2.2.6) In addition, tariff authorities are subject to a levy rate v, meaning that
when x > r they pay a further amount v(x−r) to CG. The quantity x−r
is called the growth.
(2.2.7) The levy rate is a piecewise linear function of f/r, capped at 50%.
(2.2.8) The levy funds the safety net for other LAs, so protecting them against
sharp falls in business rates income.
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(2.2.9) The result of this mechanism is that if an LA with quantities (f, r, x)
deals with CG individually, then the resulting funds it will have in hand
to provide services are a function P (f, r, x), derived from the above rules.
We can call this the payoff function.
(2.2.10) If a set of LAs indexed by i deal individually with CG they will each
receive a payoff P (fi, ri, xi). If they pool they will collectively receive a
payoff of P (
∑
fi,
∑
ri,
∑
xi).
(2.2.11) Provided that the LAs can agree among themselves how they should share
the benefits and responsibilities of the scheme, they will do better to pool
if P (
∑
fi,
∑
ri,
∑
xi) >
∑
P (fi, ri, xi).
(2.2.12) Note: P is homogeneous of degree 1 in its arguments. If it were concave it
would always be advantageous to pool. If it were convex it would never be
advantageous to pool. Since it is neither concave nor convex, the optimal
decision varies from case to case.
(2.2.13) A set of LAs is only allowed to pool if they are geographically contiguous.
(2.2.14) Although LAs can in theory choose to pool or not each year, they have to
decide before they know x for that year, and it is expected that pools will
operate for much longer, to recoup the long-term benefits of pooling.
(2.2.15) A disincentive to rearranging pools often is that LAs would have to come
to different financial arrangements with each other about how they share
the benefits and responsibilities of the pool.
(2.2.16) There is no centrally imposed scheme for the arrangements between LAs
in a pool.
(2.2.17) Summarising the above description using mathematical notation, if an
LA with quantities (f, r, x) deals with CG individually, then the resulting
funds it will have in hand to provide services are a function P (f, r, x) given
by
P (f, r, x) =

0.925f if x ≤ r − 0.075f
f + x− r if r − 0.075f ≤ x ≤ r
f + (1− v)(x− r) if x ≥ r
(1)
where v is called the levy rate for the authority and is given by
v =

1
2
if f ≤ 1
2
r
1− f/r if 1
2
r ≤ f ≤ r
0 if f ≥ r
(2)
We refer to P as the payoff function. Actual values of f/r vary between
about 0.1 and 5.
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(2.2.18) Note that if f > r then the levy rate is 0, so no top-up LA pays a levy
even if x > r: the levy can only be positive for tariff authorities.
2.3 Non-billing authorities
(2.3.1) As well as billing authorities, there are local authorities that do not collect
business rates. We will focus our attention on county councils. They
participate in this procedure as well, but their parameters are set in a
different way.
(2.3.2) They have a baseline funding level but not a business rates baseline, so
are always top-up authorities in terms of the earlier description.
(2.3.3) Although they do not collect business rates themselves, they receive 10%
of the business rates collected by the billing authorities within their area.
(This is the X/10 that was mentioned earlier.) Therefore their value of x
is 10/39 times the sum of the xi over local authorities within their area.
(2.3.4) County councils are themselves allowed to join a pool, and they partic-
ipate in it on the same basis as the other participants, but with these
different parameters, and with their larger geographical area as part of
the contiguity rules.
(2.3.5) A pool containing a county council need not contain all of the billing
authorities within that county. A pool containing a county council may
contain some billing authorities that are outside that county, provided
that they are adjacent to it or connected to it by the pool. A pool may
contain more than one county council.
3 Our work
3.1 Overview
(3.1.1) Our work falls into three broad headings.
(3.1.2) Analysis of the two LA/pool case: In §4 we use analytic methods to
explore the simple problem of determining when it’s favourable for two
LAs (or, equivalently, two pools) to combine, first with point estimates
for the business rates incomes and then with probability distributions.
(3.1.3) Data processing: In §5 we convert the available data into easily usable
forms, and we explore methods for predicting future values of x from past
data.
(3.1.4) Simulations and pooling algorithms: In §6 we use r, f and generated
distributions for x to develop possible pooling strategies across the entire
4
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country.
4 When should two individuals pool?
4.1 The set-up
(4.1.1) Suppose two LAs, A and B, want to know whether pooling would be
financially advantageous for them in the next year. Let us write PA and
PB for the amount of funding A and B would end up getting individually
and PAB for the amount they would get if they pooled. We want to know
if PAB − PA − PB is positive or negative.
(4.1.2) As fA, fB, rA and rB are known, the answer only depends on xA and xB.
We can create a graph with xA and xB along the axes and indicate in
which regions it is financially advantageous, disadvantageous or neutral
to pool. This would be a valuable tool for LAs to decide whether to pool
or not.
(4.1.3) Because P is piecewise linear with its domains of definition determined
by x−r
f
, we introduce q = x−r
f
as a dimensionless ‘x’ variable. Which
formula to use for P depends on where q lies in relation to 0 and −s,
where s = 0.075 is the safety threshold. This allows us to present our
results in a way which depends less on the actual values of fA, fB, rA and
rB.
(4.1.4) Let qAB denote
xA+xB−rA−rB
fA+fB
, the value of q if A and B pool. This is
related to qA and qB by the formula qAB =
fA
fA+fB
qA +
fB
fA+fB
qB. Hence,
qAB is always between qA and qB.
(4.1.5) Figure 1 shows the critical values of qA, qB and qAB as dashed lines. This
splits the plane up into seventeen regions in which PA, PB and PAB are
linear functions in qA, qB and qAB respectively.
4.2 Results
(4.2.1) Figure 2 adds red lines marking the boundaries between the regions where
P (fA + fB, rA + rB, xA + xB) − P (fA, rA, xA) − P (fB, rB, xB) is positive,
negative or zero, under the assumption that vA < vB. The equations for
the red lines are in Appendix A.1.
(4.2.2) Figure 3 shows the situation when vA and vB are equal and positive.
(4.2.3) Figure 4 shows the situation when vA and vB are both zero.
5
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−
r
B
f
B
Figure 1: Dashed lines show the critical values of qA, qB and qAB
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x
B
−
r
B
f
B
Figure 2: If vA < vB, what is the sign of PAB − PA − PB?
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Figure 3: If vA = vB > 0, what is the sign of PAB − PA − PB?
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B
Figure 4: If vA = vB = 0, what is the sign of PAB − PA − PB?
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4.3 Observations
(4.3.1) Pooling can only be advantageous if at least one of the potential partici-
pants expects x > r (i.e. business rates income exceeds baseline).
(4.3.2) Pooling has no advantages if both of the potential participants have a zero
levy rate.
(4.3.3) If one participant has income over the baseline and the other participant
has income between the safety net and the baseline, and v 6= 0 for at
least one participant, pooling is always advantageous if the business rates
income for the pool is less than the baseline.
(4.3.4) In plain terms, paragraph (4.3.3) implies that pooling is advantageous
if some members of the pool are sufficiently unsuccessful to drag down
the income of the pool below the expected income. Hence, there may be
perverse incentives in the pooling scheme where pooling is most favourable
for LAs that do not expect to collect their forecast business rates.
4.4 Incorporating probability distributions
(4.4.1) The above analysis is for point predictions, i.e. we have a single value for
xA and a single value for xB.
(4.4.2) It would be better to use a joint probability distribution for xA and xB.
The output would be a probability distribution for (PAB−PA−PB)/(PA+
PB).
(4.4.3) One problem with this approach is that it is hard to come up with a
joint distribution for xA and xB. The simplest way is to assume that xA
and xB are independent, so we need a probability distribution for each of
them separately. However, this ignores many possible reasons why they
might not be independent. For example, they might both depend on the
state of the national economy, which would lead to positive correlation,
or businesses might move from one LA to the other, in which case they
would be negatively correlated.
5 Data processing
5.1 Challenges in data preparation
(5.1.1) The big challenge with data processing in this project was to bring every-
thing into a consistent form. We needed to:
• Build tables for ri, fi and (for the billing authorities only) the historic
x values.
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• Deal with inconsistent spelling in the data: e.g. & or ‘and’; the
apostrophe (or lack thereof) in ‘King’s Lynn’; etc.
• Understand and implement the funding differences between the var-
ious kinds of LAs: unitary authorities, shire counties, shire districts,
London boroughs, fire authorities etc.:
– xi for billing authorities are the business rates collected multi-
plied by a conversion factor depending on type,
– xi for non-billing authorities (e.g. counties) are the sum of the
income of the constituent billing authorities multiplied by (dif-
ferent) factors.
(5.1.2) In addition to cleaning up the financial data, it was essential to know
which LAs are allowed to pool together. This is encoded in a mathematical
object called a graph, which can be though of as a list of objects and a
list saying which pairs of objects are adjacent to each other. In our case
the objects are the LAs and two LAs are considered adjacent if they can
form a pool of size two. There are two forms of adjacency: two LAs are
• logically adjacent if one LA is a county council which contains the
other LA, e.g. Gloucestershire and Stroud, or
• geographically adjacent if they are physically next to each other,
e.g. Bristol and North Somerset.
5.2 Constructing an adjacency matrix
(5.2.1) Raw data for logical adjacency was available in the form of a table indi-
cating which billing authorities belong to which county councils. It was
fairly straightforward to use this table to create an adjacency matrix.
(5.2.2) Dealing with geographical adjacency was much harder because the raw
data was not available. We constructed our own on the basis of publicly
available geographical data, using postcode centroids. For simplicity we
only considered geographical adjacency between billing authorities.
(5.2.3) In Figure 5 the picture on the left is the raw data with all the postcodes in
England (and Wales) coloured according to which billing authority they
belong to.
(5.2.4) We established coordinates for each billing authority by taking the cen-
troid of the coordinates for all the postcodes contained in it. From these
coordinates we then created a Voronoi diagram, seen on the right of Fig-
ure 5 (for England only). This gave us geographical adjacency information
that was a reasonable approximation to the truth, and was sufficient for
our purposes.
9
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Figure 5: The postcodes and billing authorities of England and, in the left hand
picture, Wales.
5.3 Approaches to modelling xt
(5.3.1) Since x for a single authority can be expected to increase exponentially
over time due to inflation, an appropriate stochastic model for x might be
xt = A exp{(µ− 0.5σ2) t+ σWt},
where t is time, Wt is a Wiener process, and A, µ and σ are all constants
that need to be determined.
(5.3.2) However, there are only nine historic data points (2003/04 to 2011/12)
and the data are often very noisy, as illustrated by Figure 6. We therefore
decided that a complicated model would give very little benefit over a very
simple model, and opted to use linear regression.
(5.3.3) The probability distribution we used for the business rates income from
each LA was a normal distribution with mean given by the linear regression
and variance given by the residuals in the linear regression.
(5.3.4) We assumed that these distributions were independent. As discussed be-
fore this is a simplifying assumption which is not necessarily justified, and
it would be better to model the dependence between the LAs.
10
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City of London non police
Figure 6: The contrasting business rates income trends of Uttlesford and the City
of London.
6 Pooling
6.1 Setting up the problem
(6.1.1) We now turn to the study of how LAs are likely to form pools.
(6.1.2) The question we considered was the optimal graph partition problem: how
should the LAs form pools in order to maximise their payoff? Academics
from two universities have expressed interest in aspects of this problem
possibly forming part of an MSc project.
(6.1.3) At this point it is worth mentioning an optimal solution that can be spot-
ted by eye.
(6.1.4) If no LA is going to need the safety net, the maximum amount of funding
can be achieved (albeit non-uniquely) by minimising the total tariff. The
levy rate for a pool made of every LA is zero because∑
f >
∑
r,
so no matter how large the business rates incomes are the pool will never
have to pay a tariff.
(6.1.5) However, this is not a realistic solution, as CG has to approve every pool
and the guidelines state that there should be a clear rationale for the
geographic coverage of proposed pools. It may be necessary to add an
extra condition to the problem to stop the formation of unrealistically
large pools.
(6.1.6) Considering every possible set of pools would take prohibitively long, and
11
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finding a more efficient algorithm that is guaranteed to find the best pos-
sible answer is very difficult. A common approach in such situations is
to use a heuristic algorithm which produces a good result in a reasonable
time.
(6.1.7) We used the following very simple heuristic algorithm:
1. Initialise each pool to contain a single LA.
2. Pick a pool at random, and find all of its neighbouring pools.
3. Choose the neighbour that leads to the largest expected value of
(PAB − PA − PB)/(PA + PB).
4. If this is above a certain (nonnegative) threshold θ then combine the
two pools.
5. Return to Step 2, and repeat until convergence is reached.
(6.1.8) The random choice in step 2 means that the algorithm will give a different
result each time it is run.
(6.1.9) In step 3 we use the expected value of (PAB − PA − PB)/(PA + PB) for
the next year. This could easily be adapted to include future years. As
discussed before, we could also replace the expected value with a different
function of the probability distribution for (PAB − PA − PB)/(PA + PB),
for example to be more risk averse. See Figure 7 for an example of this
distribution.
−4 −2 0 2 4 6 8
x 10−3
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Figure 7: Distribution of PAB−PA−PB
PA+PB
for Croydon to join with the GLA.
6.2 Videos of pooling simulations
(6.2.1) We ran our algorithm three times with different values of θ. The re-
sults were recorded in the videos PoolThresh0.avi, PoolThresh1.avi
and PoolThresh2.avi, whose final frames are shown in Figures 8, 9 and
10. Only billing authorities are shown.
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Figure 8: The final frame of the video PoolThresh0.avi, which shows the develop-
ment of pools when our algorithm was run with θ = 0. Note that one of the pools
stretches from the South West, along the south coast to the South East, and up the
east coast to the North East. This is clearly unrealistic.
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Figure 9: The final frame of the video PoolThresh1.avi, which shows the devel-
opment of pools when our algorithm was run with θ = 0.001. As expected, fewer
LAs have joined pools than in the previous run with θ = 0.
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Figure 10: The final frame of the video PoolThresh2.avi shows the development
of pools when our algorithm was run with θ = 0.002. As expected, fewer LAs have
joined pools than in the previous run with θ = 0.001.
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7 Conclusions
7.1 Conclusions
(7.1.1) For two pools with fixed f and r, there are (relatively) simple conditions
on x that indicate when they would benefit from combining.
(7.1.2) Pairwise algorithms can be used as a heuristic to obtain ‘good’ pools.
(7.1.3) When the threshold θ is too small our pairwise algorithm produces very
large pools.
7.2 Further work
(7.2.1) Look at the historic data to see how dependent the values of xi are for
adjacent LAs.
(7.2.2) Improve on our pooling algorithm, e.g. by considering more possible pair-
ings before choosing the one that increases the total payoff the most.
(7.2.3) Explore ways of keeping pools realistic beyond our use of a non-zero thresh-
old θ. Perhaps it would make sense to score potential pools using a suitable
function of the increase in payoff from forming the pool and the number
of LAs in the resulting pool.
(7.2.4) Consider whether our pooling algorithm is missing some possible pools by
only looking at two pools at a time. Is it possible to have n > 2 pools
with quantities such that it doesn’t make sense for any pair of them to
pool, but it does make sense for them all to pool?
(7.2.5) Consider functions of the probability distribution for PAB−PA−PB
PA+PB
other
than the expected value. It might be helpful to suggest some to LAs
which are risk adverse, for example.
(7.2.6) Within a pool, how should the payoff be split between the LAs? A simple
approach would be to split it in proportion to the payoff each LA would
have received if it hadn’t pooled. However, it would be interesting to
consider what bargaining power each LA in the pool might have by looking
at the payoff the pool would expect without it.
A Appendices
A.1 Equations of plots
(A.1.1) Figure 11 is a copy of Figure 2 with the red line segments which are not
parallel to the qA or qB axis labelled. Below we list the equations of each
16
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of the labelled line segments. We use vAB to denote the value of v for A
and B if they pool, i.e. the value of v calculated using f = fA + fB and
r = rA + rB in equation (2).
0
0
−s
−s
zero
zero
−ve
−ve
+ve
+ve
−ve
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)(8)
qA =
xA−rA
fA
q B
=
x
B
−
r
B
f
B
Figure 11: If vA < vB, what is the sign of PAB − PA − PB?
qA = −vB−vAB1−vAB
fB
fA
qB − s1−vAB (3)
qA = −vB fBfA qB − s (4)
qB =
vAB−vA
vB−vAB
fA
fB
qA (5)
qB = −(vAB − vA) fAfB qA (6)
qB =
vAB−vA
1−vAB
fA
fB
qA − s1−vAB (7)
qB = −vA fAfB qA − s . (8)
(A.1.2) Note that when 1
2
rA ≤ fA ≤ rA and 12rB ≤ fB ≤ rB, the identity
vAB =
rA
rA+rB
vA +
rB
rA+rB
vB holds, from which it follows that equation (5)
is equivalent to
xA
rA
=
xB
rB
. (9)
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